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Reply to Brabanter 
 
 
Philippe de Brabanter notes that paradigmatic singular terms, namely proper names, 
‘canonically’ refer to individuals ; he therefore finds it strange that quotations, insofar 
as they act as singular terms, should always refer to types, i.e. to abstract objects or 
classes of individuals, as most theorists of quotation think they do. There is, he points 
out, no a priori reason why closed quotations should have a single, homogenous kind 
of reference. He therefore tentatively endorses the ‘referential diversity’ thesis. 
On this issue I am quite open-minded. I hold that closed quotations refer to the 
type they demonstrate, but that view, which I maintain, is not « necessary for the 
consistency of [my] framework », contrary to what Brabanter says. I would be happy 
to accept the thesis of ‘referential diversity’ if sufficient evidence was adduced in its 
favour. Does Philippe de Brabanter provide such evidence in his paper ? I do not 
think so. 
Let us start by laying out my framework, within which Philippe de Brabanter sets 
up his own discussion. I distinguish three sorts of thing one does in quoting : one 
displays a token, one demonstrates a type, and one (optionally) depicts a target. 
Token-display is something that takes place in all instances of quotation (whether 
open or closed) but also in many forms of language use that are not quotational. A 
token is displayed when the speaker who produces it specifically draws the hearer’s 
attention to it, and that is something that also happens whenever one stresses a 
particular word or phrase. What is distinctive of quotation is the fact that the token is 
displayed not e.g. in order to contrast it with some other expression which might have 
been used in its place (contrastive stress) but  in order to demonstrate – illustrate by 
exemplification – some property or complex of properties which it instantiates. This 
property or complex of properties is the ‘demonstrated type’. So what distinguishes 
quotational displays from other linguistic displays is the speaker’s demonstrative 
intention. 
The demonstration itself has a (higher-level) purpose. Sometimes, one 
demonstrates a type in order to picture (or, as I say,  ‘depict’) something that is of that 
type, through some form of mimicry. In other cases (‘flat mention’) one demonstrates 
a type in order to communicate something directly about that type, without attempting 
to depict a particular token — or anything else — as being of that type. Whenever 
there is an attempt at depicting something through the demonstration, I call the object 
of the depiction the ‘target’ of the quotation. (See below for qualifications) 
The distinction between the three components is common to open and closed 
quotation. What distinguishes closed from open quotation is the fact that, in closed 
quotation, something additional happens : the demonstration is recruited as a 
singular term and endowed with a linguistic reference. In open quotation, one 
displays a token and thereby demonstrates a type, without referring to either the 
token or the type (let alone to whatever one is attempting to depict through the 
demonstration). Thus when, in Hôtel du Nord, the character played by Arletty says 
 
- ‘Atmosphère’, ‘atmosphère’… Est-ce que j’ai une gueule d’atmosphère ? 
 
she mimicks her interlocutor’s use of the word ‘atmosphère’ (target) by producing two 
tokens of the same type, but she refers neither to the tokens which she herself 
produces, nor to the token which her interlocutor has just produced and which she 
imitates, nor to the type which all these tokens instantiate. In contrast, if I say 
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- ‘Atmosphère’ is a word which has been made famous by Arletty 
 
then my demonstration of the word ‘atmosphère’ (a token of which I display) is 
recruited as a singular term referring to that word, and filling the role of subject in the 
sentence. 
 So far, so good. Now the question arises : what exactly does the closed 
quotation refer to ? Does it refer to the displayed token, to the demonstrated type, to 
the target (if there is one), or to anything else ? Does it always refer to the same sort 
of thing, or is its reference variable, as Brabanter claims? 
Before answering these questions, I should say something more about the notion 
of depicted target. Brabanter rightly notes that, for me, the notions of target and of 
mimicry are interdependent, and I must explain why that is so. 
Imagine that the speaker is reporting Arletty’s speech. He says : 
 
(1) And then she uttered the famous sentence  ‘Est-ce que j’ai une gueule 
d’atmosphère’. 
 
It is pretty clear that the speaker is talking about Arletty’s utterance and conveying 
information about it. So Arletty’s utterance is the speaker’s target, as it were. But it is 
not — or not necessarily — the ‘target’ of the quotation in the technical sense in 
which I use the term. For a quotation to have a target in this narrow sense, it must 
have mimetic properties in virtue of which it evokes something, namely, that thing 
which it pictures or depicts. If the speaker pronounces the quoted words ‘Est-ce que 
j’ai une gueule d’atmosphère’ with Arletty’s accent, for example, the quotation will be 
understood as mimicking Arletty’s utterance, and the latter will acquire the status of 
target. But if there is no mimicry — and, like Brabanter, « I do not see why it should 
be impossible to simply report someone’s words without the slightest amount of 
mimicry » — then it is unclear that my restricted notion of target applies, even though 
the speaker talks about Arletty’s utterance and attempts to characterize it. 
To see why that is so, consider a negative variant of the example : 
 
- But she did not actually utter the sentence ‘Est-ce que j’ai une gueule 
d’atmosphère’ 
 
Here it is obvious that the quotation is not offered as a picture of Arletty’s utterance : 
on the contrary the speaker asserts that her utterance was not of the demonstrated 
type, and it would be contradictory simultaneously to offer a type as picturing the 
target while denying that the target is of that type. Still, the speaker is talking about 
Arletty’s utterance and attempts to provide information regarding it. It follows that 
what the speaker is talking about (the speaker’s target, as it were) is not necessarily 
the target of the quotation in my sense. The relation of a quotation to its target does 
not depend upon the rest of the sentence. The quotation itself, in virtue of its mimetic 
properties, is offered as a picture of the target, and whenever that is so it would be 
contradictory to deny that the target in question is of the demonstrated type. A good 
example is provided by the parenthetical ‘he said’ which, as Cornulier pointed out, 
can only be appended to a linguistic demonstration endowed with mimetic properties. 
In the schema 
 
- p, he said 
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the quotation which the letter ‘p’ stands for is bound to be mimetic, so that negation is 
impossible : 
 
- * p, he did not say 
 
I admit that this is a rather complex and controversial story. For my present 
purposes, it suffices to point out that there is a distinction between what the speaker 
is talking about and the target of the quotation (in the restricted sense in which I use 
that term). For this distinction is enough to invalidate one of Brabanter’s two 
arguments in favour of his view that quotations sometimes refer to a particular token. 
Brabanter’s argument runs like this. In many cases, like (1) above, it is clear that 
the speaker is talking about a particular token (e.g. Arletty’s utterance). Yet I hold that 
the quotation refers to the demonstrated type. In my framework, Brabanter says, the 
distinction between target and demonstratum provides a way out : one may say that 
what is demonstrated is a type, while the target is a token. But this solution, 
Brabanter argues, is not available in a case like (1), for the following reason : since 
we assume that the report has no mimetic properties, the quotation can be ascribed 
no target. Hence the intution that the speaker somehow ‘refers’ to  Arletty’s particular 
utterance is not accounted for. To account for it, he says, we must either give up the 
view that the quotation refers to the type (and admits that in that sort of case it refers 
to a token), or, in order to make a ‘target’ available, implausibly maintain that some 
form of mimicry is involved in all cases in which, intuitively, the quoter talks about a 
particular token. 
In my view this argument bears no force. The intuition that the speaker somehow 
‘refers’ to Arletty’s utterance can be accounted for quite easily, simply by saying that 
the speaker is reporting Arletty’s utterance and providing a characterization of it. 
Beside the displayed token, the demonstrated type, and the depicted target, a fourth 
notion is available : what the speaker is talking about (what earlier I called the 
speaker’s target). That is all we need to take care of Brabanter’s examples. 
Brabanter’s second argument in favour of the thesis of referential diversity 
appeals to the phenomenon of iterated quotation, illustrated by the following 
example : 
 
(2) In each utterance of the previous sentence [‘Boston’ is a six letter word ], 
« ‘Boston’ » refers to an orthographic form. 
 
Brabanter argues that, « for the subject of ‘Boston’ is a six letter word to be able to 
refer to an orthographic form, it must be a token » (p. 13). Let us assume that he is 
right and that only tokens can refer. Does it not follow that the iterated quotation 
« ‘Boston’ » in (2) refers to a token ? Well, not necessarily. A token may be 
represented as a pair consisting of (i) a type and (ii) a context in which the type is 
tokened. Let us now assume that the iterated quotation « ‘Boston’ » in (2) refers to a 
type, in accordance with my view. Sentence (2) says that in each utterance of the 
previous sentence, this type refers to an orthographic form. Now the words ‘in each 
utterance of the previous sentence’ provide a context for the type; and once the type 
is paired with an appropriate context, it becomes a token and can refer. To sum up : 
we can accept that ‘only tokens refer’, while maintaining that in (2) the quotation 
refers to a type ; for the type in question is said to refer not by itself (qua type), but 
insofar as it occurs in a certain context (qua token). 
 4 
 I conclude that Brabanter has failed to establish the referential diversity thesis. 
This is not to deny that, in some (rather exceptional) cases, a quotation may perhaps 
refer to a token. Manuel Garcia-Carpintero described one such case during the 
Granada workshop. But such cases arguably involve a metonymy, similar to that in 
virtue of which one can refer to, say, a person by means of a quotation. (Thus 
François Mitterrand’s son Christophe was referred to in Africa as ‘Papa m’a dit’.) 
 
